Anthropic Web of the Universe:
Atom and Atman

by Plamen Gradinarov
Philosophy East & West
Vol.39 No.1 (January 1989), pp. 27-46
University of Hawaii Press
 
Addressing topics in
Indian Philosophy & Logic, cognition of Alter Ego,
and modern cosmology

The main arguments of Vaisesika in favor of the all-pervasiveness of Atman amount to a number of cosmological and physical premises. If Atman lacked all-pervasion, the cosmo-evolutionary process would not have been started at all, for there would be no 'simultaneous conjunction with atoms from other regions of space'. The simultaneous conjunction of atoms is necessary for putting the great vehicle of the Universe into motion.
 
Mahesvara, when taken as transcendental entity irrelevant to man, cannot explain the simultaneity of the initial cosmo-synthetic process; nor should one rely upon adrsta. Neither the great Lord of the Universe nor the unseen force count as legitimate categories of the Nyaya-Vaisesika categoriology. Taking into consideration the rigorous logic of evolution as exemplified by Nyaya-Vaisesika, one should concede that the role of the ultimate cosmological regulator should be assigned to Atman, keeping in mind that its theological function is a result of much later interpolations.

The Vaisesikas, according to the great Jaina logician Sri Mallisena-suri, argue that if Atman was not all-pervading there would be no simultaneous conjunction of atoms. This means that the rise of more complex material aggregates would be hampered, if not rendered impossible. And if the formation of the complex aggregates could not take place, then all organic bodies, man's body included, would also not appear. The negation of Atman's all-pervasiveness predicates the non-existence of man and the empirical abhava (negation, lack) of the Self. The very fact of human existence imposes a number of weak or strong limitations upon the initial stage in the evolution of the early Universe.
 
The present existence of man predicates an isotropic and homogeneous Universe, while the isotropy and the homogeneity of Universe depend on the all-pervasiveness of Atman. This kind of reasoning brings us closely to the logic of argumentation proper to the so-called Anthropic cosmological principle.

Just like the other orthodox schools, the NyAya-Vaisesika reshapes some of the traditional conceptions of Atman presented in the Vedas. It gingerly puts to doubt the central Vedic injunction, tat tvam asi ("That thou art"), according to which there is an ultimate coincidence of the minutest, atom-like Self and the greatest being (sat). The profound dialectics contained in this injunction has been taken over by the Vaisesikas only in its nominal, superficial form and correspondingly turned into occasion for interpreting Atman as an all-pervading substance. However, according to UddAlaka, the concept of atom-Atman falls together with the notion of supreme reality because, for all its substantiality, the Atmic atom is dimensionless and rather amorphous. In its turn, Jaina defines the atoms as possessing no particular form, while Atman is said to occupy the place inhabited by the animate body.[4] NyAya-Vaisesikas carry out the splitting of the original unity of atom and Atman in another direction: atoms become lacking in magnitude, while Atman attains allpervasiveness. This line of conceptual development and transformation of the original Vedic notion of atom, Atman, and sat (or Brahman), has been quite correctly expressed by Paul Masson-Oursel in his famous article on Indian atomism.[5]

Having once surpassed the primitive dialectical comprehension of atom, Atman, and Brahman, Indian thought, captured by the feeling of the immensity and structural infinity of their actual being, has always been searching for the exact ratio of these three categories. NyAya-Vaisesika has also greatly contributed to balancing the two main types of infinity: the minutest infinity (that is, the infinitesimality) of atom, and the all-pervading infinity of Atman. It should be noted, however, that whereas the original teaching of KanAda stressed the logical and ontological aspects of the dialectical interaction between the already mentioned abimes (abysses) of infinity, the late interpretations of PrasastapAda, Udayana, and Sridhara should, to a great extent, be regarded as a result of compromising between atomism and monism. Instead of investigating the material relationships which may subsist between atoms and Atman, they focused their attention on the elucidation of the possible role of Brahman, conceived as the theological prime mover of the world, in his creating and destroying hypostasis of Isvara. It is a more than curious coincidence that the concept of atom has undergone similar modifications in the Yoga-bhAsya of VyAsa, where the atom is also taken to denote the supreme reality, as well as in Sankara's commentary on the Brahma-sutra. Sankara, the greatest thinker of VedAnta, transforms the atom-Atman into supreme Atman (paramAtman) and is bound to call Brahman supreme atom (paramAnu) because of his unity and indivisibility.[6]

One of the crucial problems for the NyAya-Vaisesika ontology, cosmology, and "Atmalogy"7 is the establishment of Atman's identity. The problem here is that Atmans, being innumerable and all-pervasive, should permeate each other. Is there any evidence at all that my consciousness as a metaphysical quality of Atman should be attributed precisely to my Atman and not to the Atman of my neighbors facing the same problem? According to Jaina and UddAlaka, the size of Atman does not contradict its eternality, for, in the first case, it is as large as the body occupied by it and capable of changing its size following the extensive modulation of the body. As for UddAlaka, he does not even put up the problem because there is no distinctive discrimination between atom-Atman and sat (= Brahman), which are considered to be an example of coincidentia oppositorum.

The self-contradictory Vaisesika characteristic of Atman as possessing all-pervasiveness (vibhutvavat) and nonuniqueness (anaikAntika) produces a number of conceptual difficulties. For example, what are the ultimate criteria for defining an all-pervading substance as something separate (prthak), that is, as an individual entity? Are the many mutually permeating substances capable of self-differentiation? - and so on. These questions cannot arise regarding the equally all-pervading substances of AkAsa, space and time, because their identity is warranted by their substantial singularity. The situation with Atman, however, is radically different because the variety (nAnA) of Atmans follows from the "circumstantial variety" underlying it.[8]

Before proceeding with the analysis of the commentary of Sankara Misra on the above-mentioned sutra of KanAda, let us consider the relations between atom and Atman in the light of their mutual theoretical determinacy. It has been said that the notion of atom has been arrived at in Indian philosophy by trying to define rationally the nature of that intimate fine substance which supports man's conscious, emotional, retributive, and volitional activity. Now, conversely, it is demonstrated that the definition of Atman should necessarily be related to the definition of the material substances. In doing so, there are two possibilities for defining Atman as something "own-natural" (svabhAvika):

(a) By analogy: "Its substantiality and eternality are explained by air.[9] This aphorism is elucidated by Sankara Misra in the following way: "As there is no criterion [for the establishment] of the imaginary parts of aerial atomhence [its] eternality - so of manas also. The meaning is that as atom of air is substance because of [its] possessing qualities, so Atman.[10]

(b) By transcendental apophansis, which is a kind of phenomenological epoche combined with a demonstration from the impossibility of the opposite. Considering Atman as the possible Transcendental Ego, metaphysically supporting the emotional life of the empirical individual, Sri VallabhAcArya makes it clear that "the cause of pleasure differs from the other [things] because of the 'material causality' (upAdAnatva) of pleasure. In this or that way it [the material cause] is not the earth. Here the material cause is not the earth and the other five objects [of the sense organsl because of the external noncausation of the internal objects. Otherwise, even [the cause] of knowledge would have to be [explained as] due to some fact born from the body etc. Nor is it the very knowledge for, otherwise, even [the originl of sound would be due to a similar fact."

In his UpaskAra, Sankara Misra develops an externalist approach to the interpretation of VS IV.1.20. According to him, the variety of our life circumstances should be regarded as the main reason for the actual variety of the Atmans. There are men both rich and poor, happy and disappointed, and so forth. Variety of Atmans is to be explained from the variety of conditions in which we live and from our differences in social status.[12]

Despite this seemingly materialist explanation[l3] of the origin of conscious life and the substantial differences between the particular Atmans, the inter-pretation of Sankara Misra can hardly be called consistently materialistic. If we concede that my Atman does ultimately depend upon the external circumstances only, then I should recognize that at different stages of my life I must possess different Atmans and have them modified with every successive turn in my material development. If it is said that the modifications of my Atman depend not on the different social conditions I am running through, but on my being a temporal entity, then it could be held that there are people living in comparatively one and the same condition; hence, they should possess one and the same Atman. This assumption, however, runs counter to the metaphysical individuality of Atmans. And lastly, if Atmans were to be connected to particular places and circumstances, they would not be: (1) all-pervading, and (2) possessing the qualities of conjunction and disjunction which are of universal application.

Considerably more consistent, from a logical point of view, is the explanation of Sridhara. In his opinion, the plurality of Atmans can by no means be doubted. Yet, it should be established what precisely is the sense of the word plurality, or variety of conditions. The specific peculiarity of Sridhara's conception is that plurality means nonrecognition of the cognitions, pleasures, pains, and so forth belonging to other people. When, for instance, we experience pleasure, the corresponding feelings are to be related to my own person and not to that of the others; "and if the experience were one and the same in all bodies, then we would have a similar idea with reference to the experience of other persons: as a matter of fact, however, we have no such recognition; and from this we infer that there is a distinct self in each body.[14]

In order to substantiate the existence of Alter Ego (the Atman of the other), we perform, at the first stage, a kind of analytical reduction. The main goal of it is to clear off all those elements of experience that impede the process of realization of my own subjectivity. In other words, we expose the psychological experiences that constitute the vertical (temporal) axis of our personal identity. If the cognitions and experiences were common to all living bodies, then we would discriminate only what has been equally discerned by every- body. As a natural consequence, consciousness would be one for all because of the diffusion of ideas. As far as this does not happen, we are forced to assume the separate existence of Atman in every individual body. Here, non-recognition means the absence of falsifying instances. Without a doubt, it is of an apophalic nature, for the existence of my own Atman comes to be established by the impossibility of discovering it in the experiences of the others. The opponent may reply that Atman should be one in all bodies because having different experiences is not indicative of the existence of many Atmans. As in the case with AkAsa, which is only one, we have different sounds produced as to the differences in the ear cavities; similarly, in the case of the one Atman, we can explain the differences of experience as due to the diversity of body limitations. Sridhara rejects this by introducing the categories of dharma and adharma (merit and demerit). If we take body to be the boundary condition giving rise to individual consciousness, then we should recognize that Atman is one and there is only one kind of dharma and adharma, which renders totally inexplicable the different fates of people. They would experience equal pleasure and pain, which would result in enormous moral disturbances due to the absence of retributive distinctions.

Anyway, it is not the body that makes different the experiences of Atman but rather manas. The internal sense organ should be counted as the veritable principle of diversification. It is its conjunction with Atman that provides the individual characteristics of consciousness.Yet the perplexing difficulty remains of just how to combine two so contradictory assertions, which simultaneously maintain (1) the all-pervasiveness of Atman, and (2) its separateness (prthaktva) with reference to the conscious life of the individual. Sridhara supplies a rather unsatisfactory solution consisting in the superficial union of the two previous theses, supported by the moral function of karman. Though the particular cognitions are common to all bodies, the all-pervading Atmans are present in each of them. Every Atman experiences such pleasure and pain, which depend on the concrete body and the foregoing karman of the Self. Consequently, the body restrictions on Atman should eventually be attributed to the limitations produced by karman.

The lines of reasoning above are of exceedingly great importance in the constitution of the anthropic explanation of the universe; for this reason they should be given special attention. Continuing the preceding analysis, the other Selves are eventually differentiated not by themselves but rather through the action of the Law of Karman, leaving aside the action of the ultimate particularities (antyavisesa) - the central place among which is taken up by the atoms. Such methods and mechanisms of differentiating between Atmans, as stated before, cannot be a radical solution to the question of the own-nature of consciousness. The ever-growing clash between individual Self and supreme reality or universal nature cannot be overcome as simply as that. Sridhara supposes that material manas should be taken as the main cause for the differentiation process of the many Selves. If this standpoint is assumed, one cannot readily answer the question as to why there is a plurality of Atmans; for, from this position, it is much easier to postulate the existence of one Atman only, which, under the influence of the material manas and the action of existential karman, would be differentiated into many Selves, enjoying and suffering a great number of individual lives. This, however, is not compatible with the theoretical constructions of Sridhara. For him, human Selves, or Atmans, are not simply reflections of the pure and intelligible Brahman; nor are they his empirical modifications, for this would contradict the true nature of the supreme reality.

Anyway, the question of the size of Atman is crucial for NyAya-Vaisesika. It is given central place, too, in the SyAd-vAda-mannjari of the outstanding Jaina logician and dialectician, Mallisena. The whole chapter nine of the work is dedicated to critical examination of the Vaisesika theory of the size of Atman. This analysis is very important because Jaina criticism is carried out in close connection with the elaboration of the atomistic theories of the schools.Following the general rules of disputation, Mallisena exposes, to begin with, the views of the opponents, that is, KanAda and PrasastapAda, and gives then a brief account of the Jaina position on the question. The arguments of Vaisesika, as presented by Mallisena, are in general terms the same as the ones dealt with above. The main stress, however, is placed not upon the moral issues of the doctrine, but rather on its physical and cosmological implications. We shall try to reconstruct them by adding some missing conceptual links and original fragments from other authors writing in the tradition of NyAya-Vaisesika.

As stated in the very beginning, if Atman was not all-pervading, the cosmological process of creation would not be initiated at all for the simple reason that there would be no simultaneous conjunction - which here is to be understood as a kind of dialectical principle of universal connection of atomsfrom all various regions of the Universe. The simultaneous conjunction of atoms plays, as it seems, an extraordinary role in the cosmology of Vaisesika. It is an indispensable prerequisite and a sort of efficient cause, putting into motion the whole kingdom of matter. And what should be specially emphasized is that the followers of KanAda are said to maintain that if Atman was not all-pervading, there would be no conjunction whatsoever between the atoms - which means that the constitution of Atman's body will be prevented. Thus, it has been stressed, the all-pervading size of Atman is a fact of great anthropogenic importance.

This conception of Vaisesika deserves more attentive examination. It makes possible the reconstruction of a thoroughgoing representation of the NyAya-Vaisesika type of atomism or, at least, fosters the elaboration of those physical and metaphysical problems which have been touched, but, unfortunately, not explicitly developed, by the scholars pertaining to the tradition. First of all, the question should be set forth about the source of motion of atoms. It is clear, from a general look at the categorial system of NyAyaVaisesika, that matter and its source of motion are two different categories, for the simple reason that motion cannot subsist in itself; it is always a motion, or action, inherent in some particular substance. Instead of source of motion we can use the more exact expression incentive of motion, for it is known from the latter conceptions of Vaisesika that atoms are in perpetual rotary motion (parispanda). So the question here is not about the category of motion [l5] as a regular category of the Vaisesika metaphysics, but rather about that particular form of motion which renders the atoms operative: that is, the cosmologically relevant cause opening the process of combination and recombination.

Thus, the hypothesis in which we are engaged takes the many Atmans as substantial metaphysical sources of intentional energy,[16] constantly emitting impulses which transform the internal and inherent rotary motion of atoms into a kind of universal synthetic motion, bringing about the progressive line of cosmological evolution. This circumstance is of great significance, for KanAda has not offered an exhaustive explanation of the causes for the "stirring up" of the atoms and their successive combination - except for that of the mysterious role of adrsta, which, however, is without any scientific im-portance when related to the realm of transcendental phenomena.

On the other hand, it can be objected that the proposed explanation of Atman as noninherent cause acting along the reprocessing of the atomistic Universe likewise reveals no trace of scientific significance. This, however, is not the case. In contemporary cosmology, there are many explanatory models taking into account the possible role of a conscious factor in the development of the Universe. For instance, according to the participatory formulation of the anthropic cosmological principle, no elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is a registered phenomenon. Thus, the act of measurement, says J. A. Wheeler, has an inescapable effect on the future of the electron. The observer finds himself willy-nilly a participator. In some strange sense, this is a participatory Universe. "Beginning with the Big Bang, the universe expands and cools. After eons of dynamic development, it gives rise to observership. Acts of observer-participancy - via the mechanism of the delayed choice experiment - in turn give tangible reality to the universe not only now but back to the beginning. To speak of the universe as a self-excited circuit is to imply once more a participatory universe.[17]

The notion of a participatory universe can be said to be fundamental within the framework of the metaphysical teaching of NyAya-Vaisesika, It is widely discussed by the commentators of NyAya-sutra and especially by Uddyotakara and VAcaspati Misra. To begin with, we shall introduce the corresponding problems through a very characteristic text of PAsupatAcArya:

Which is the immediate material cause of the world since the live IIsvara is efficient [cause]? It is said that these are the suprasubtle (paramasuksma) atoms making up the [manifested] substances....Which is the doctrine on the causality of the founding IIsvara (punarisvara)? This doctrine is explained - PradhAna, Atom and Karman, regulated by the previous activity of an intelligent cause, come to be activated (pravartante) because of the un-consciousness [of the atoms, etc.]; as the existing, etc. intelligent [man] puts into operation an axe [that is] present there, because of its unconsciousness (acetanatva), so PradhAna [ultimate substance], Atom and Karma, which ale unconscious, come to be stimulated; therefore they are also regulated by an intelligent cause.[18]

This is only part of the long commentary on NS IV.1.21, which runs as follows: "Not a reason because of the facsimilarity.[19] These words of Gautama have deeply touched the metaphysical imagination of the later scholars. The most modest interpretation of them is that of VAtsyAyana, pointing out that "llsvara takes care of man as a doer; Isvara creates the fruit of whatever action of man. When Isvara does not create there is also no result of human karman. Therefore it is not a reason because of the facsimilarity of llsvara. By the absence of human action the result is not produced.[20] In spite of their purely anthropological accent, the ideas developed by VAtsyAyana have also a deep physical relevance. Their meaning is that karman, or the action of man, cannot be a reason substantiating the activity of atoms taken as the material cause of the manifested world - and all this because of the facsimilarity of the results of the good or evil actions of man in relation to the actions, or wishes, of llsvara. In his NyAya-vArttika-tAtparyatikA, VAcaspati Misra has pointed out on this account that "the activity of atoms as material cause (upAdAna) is with regard to the actions of man; Isvara is the stimulating cause (nimitta). Through him [comes about] the observed action of man, although Isvara is only the stimulating cause.[21]

It should be noted that nimitta, apart from the previous meaning of instrumental or stimulating cause, is also a kind of teleological cause, judging from the semantics of the word. Atoms are activated with the ultimate aim of giving rise to Atman's body, that is, to the body of Atman possessing noneternal cognitions. This immanent Atman is, however, indiscernible in its essence from the essence of llsvara because of the dialectical coincidence of the opposites promulgated yet by UddAlaka. In the history of Indian philosophy, the dialectical coincidence of atom and Atman has persisted for many centuries and can be met, notwithstanding the apparent contradictoriness of it and stubborn opposition to the special rule of the all-pervasiveness of Atman, even in the works of the NaiyAyikas and Vaisesikas, from UdayanAcArya to Kesava Misra. According to the latter, Atman has the size of an atom and is situated in the heart of the sage (sic: UddAlaka), while Udayana is arguing that Atman is not bigger than an atom, though capable of pervading the whole body (sic: Jaina). Therefore, we cannot agree with the contention of G. Sundara Ramayah, holding that the Atman is permanent, while its quality buddhi is nonpermanent,[22] because this contradicts the fundamental assumption of Atman as being ever-intelligent, quite independently of its size and actual body conformity. Nor can we agree that this is the proper opinion of VAcaspati Misra as fixed in his NVTT I.1.10, because it is said quite explicitly that "although the internal Atmans are the bearers of the connections with noneternal cognition, nevertheless it is just Atman in general that is connected with an eternal buddhi, etc., due to its being the bearer of connections with the quality of buddhi, etc.[23]

Commenting on the words of VAtsyAyana to the effect that consciousness should be attributed to the bearer of relations with the rough material substances,24 VAcaspati Misra produces a comparatively long explanation which is worth quoting:

The sense is - because of [its] being the bearer of conjunction. In the same way, there is no deviation (vyabhicAra) by means of color, etc. So great is the teaching of the long gone preceptor! It is because of this that being moves and there are developing (bhavanti) commonly known conscious factors, like the creeper on the walls of the palace. These are widely known contradictions, as for instance, the 'atoms of AkAsa'. Conscious factors are dubious [in the same manner] as that the weaker is the master of the stronger. And so, either because of the 'epistemological objectness' (prameyatva), or due to illusion [rooted] in the absence of verifying and falsifying arguments, [there appears] a doubt in the conscious 'doer-ness' (kartrtva). And the 'perceptual non-apprehension' (pratyaksAnupalabdhi) is not intended to be here only a disproving [instance]. The existence (satA) [sie] of properly naturalistic defects [viprakarsa here can be translated also as alontanation, as opposed to approximation, and as difference] is present even in the perceptual non-apprehension of the atoms etc.[25]

Let us now try to produce a sort of subcommentary on what VAcaspati Misra has said. The sense of it is that the atoms, albeit a substrate of the activity, cannot be taken to be the subject of conscious activity. Being is in a perpetual motion, indeed, but from this it does not follow that consciousness should be developed from the atoms and rise like the clinging plant on the walls of the king's palace. It is said that the consciousness of atoms is rather dubious, for the weaker cannot overpower the stronger one - the small atoms cannot impose their will on the infinitely great IIsvara at least because they are devoid of the quality termed "volition" (prayatna). Doubts in the consciousness of the substrate of activity, that is, the general notion of the doer, appear owing to three main types of causes: (a) There is insufficient articulation of it as an object of the correct knowledge; that is, there is the impossibility of being immediately perceived - save in the acts of yogic insight - and there is the apparent incompleteness of the logical procedures with the help of which one infers its existence. The architectonics of the syllogism demonstrating the atoms' being has some definite shortcomings because (b) the probans can never be perceptually verified, and (c) there is a demonstrative lack of falsifying arguments. This is precisely the meaning of the phrase that the perceptual nonapprehension of the atoms is not intended to be only an instance rejecting their existence. Moreover, the perceptual nonapprehension of the atoms depends, to a great extent, on the own-nature of the cognitive subject attempting to prove their existence. On the strength of their own-nature, most of the people do not actually perceive the atoms, yet there exist specially trained men capable of contemplating the atom and even penetrating into its most intimate structure.

Anyway, even the yogic perception cannot substantiate the search for universal validity (prasiddhi), because of the required universality-both subjective and objective - of all veridical statements. This is especially important in knowing the material cause of the manifested world. VAcaspati Misra writes:

Material cause is known in one and the same way both to ourselves and to yourselves. It is said that the distinctions of atom as object of knowledge, subject of inherence, and unchangeable [unique, nonalternative] substratum of action should be known on the strength of a canon from the similar llsvara, but in no way as something empirically manifested. It is said that dharma and adharma should be postulated as connected with the paramount purusa on the strength of [the fact that there is a] connection, therefore, evidently, conjunction and inherence are two [different types of] connections, due to the impossibility of the rise of inherence between the conjoined and the subject of conjunction. As for the atoms or the comprehension of the own dharma, even llsvara should create [his] objectivation [reflections, emanations] as his own effect, just like the one actually searching for knowledge [does mentally reconstruct] the actual piece [of the pot, and so forth] as a reflection of the activity [on its] production. Thereby the intelligent material cause is also explained.[26]

As a matter of fact, there should have been, in the history of the Indian philosophy of atomism, a great deal of controversial opinions concerning the ultimate causes stimulating the cosmo-creative motion of the atoms. Apart from dharma and adharma, the action (karman) of man seems to have performed an important role in the metaphysical play directed on the stage of the Universe. Unfortunately, we do not have any corroborating textual evidence; but, judging from the logic of the disputation proper to medieval NaiyAyikas, it can be supposed, with a high degree of certainty, that such a conception did not lack the support of the scientific community. Having in mind the views of Sridhara represented above, we shall now turn to the criticism of Uddyotakara, violently rejecting the very possibility of such views:

With the help of causality (kAranatva) [some] depict atoms as directed by the active karman of man in regard to which it is said that atoms as acting should permanently be in action (pravrtti). [Objection:] But, aren't they acting as "related to the peculiarities of time" (kAlavisesApeksAh)? [Answer:] Time is explained by atoms - as atoms are relevant to the direction (adhisthA) of an intelligent subject, so time [also]; for it is said that the unconsciousness there cannot be suspended (nivartata). [Objection:] But, isn't it said that the action even of the unconscious subject of milk, etc. is volitional (cet, intentional), that as the activity of the unconscious milk, etc. is "for the sake of nourishing the children" (apatyabharanArtha), so, in the same way, even the unconscious atoms "will have to be activated for the sake of man" (purusArtham pravartisyanta)? [Answer:j This is not relevant (na yukta), due to the uniformity of probandum (sAdhya): just like the autonomous (svatantra) atoms are acting [and] this is the propandum, so autonomous, unconscious milk, etc. must be acting - [it] should act even in dead [cows], yet [it] does not act; therefore it should be understood that it is directed by an intelligent cause. And this ground therefore is not working; similarly, in the final analysis, [it turns out that] it acts unconsciously; [while] all that is directed by conscious will (cetanA).[27]

All this (the opponent's views) granted, the following scheme of the cosmic evolutionary process may be outlined. The impulses emanating from the Atman substances transform the potential parispandic energy of atomic motion into kinetic energy, integrating - and at the same time differentiating - atoms into aggregates. Vaisesika is universally recognized as having laid the foundations of Indian mechanics by analyzing the main types of motion. Therefore, it is quite natural for a Vaisesika to analyze precisely the world mechanism, as well as the laws governing the relationships between the parts of the world, taken in their various forms of endless motion. In doing so, the main attention has been shifted from the whole to the particular characteristics, from the evolutionary nature of the things to their mechanical disposition in the world. Aspects of the "natural science" grasping the holistic or the evolutionary nature of reality do not find any systematic reflection in the philosophy of NyAya-Vaisesika. They are chiefly elaborated by VedAnta, which lays the main emphasis on the organic totality of the world while disregarding the mechanics of its parts, and by SAnkhya, with its refined doctrine of the integral evolution of the world-whole and its organic parts.

On the whole, NyAya-Vaisesika keeps confidently to the general mechanistic tendency prevailing in the teachings of the early school, following, at the same time, the metaphysical doctrine of the eternality and substantiality of Atman. The characteristic features of this doctrine should be explained as being the result of attempts to counterbalance the thoroughgoing mechanistic tendency of the school by developing the idea of the many substanceswhose sum total can be compared to a special kind of metaphysical mechanism - warranting the wholeness of the individual objects. In that particular case, Atman should be taken as the metaphysical pluralistic equivalent and universal substitute for the organic totality and differential evolution of the world.

Thus, the representatives of NyAya-Vaisesika remain, in the final analysis, faithful to the mechanistic disposition of the early Vaisesika, combining the pluralism of the substances (the great elements, space, time, and manas) with the pluralism of the system-building principle. This pluralistic attitude constitutes the most substantial connection between the atomistic theory and the doctrine of Atman within the framework of the classical NyAyaVaisesika.

In trying to substantiate this, we shall once again have a look at the critical work of Mallisena, presenting yet another corroborative evidence of the close ties existing between the NyAya-Vaisesika theory of atoms and the teaching of the Atman's all-pervading nature. "Through the pervasiveness of Atman," says Mallisena, "all atoms are in conjunction with it."[28] The meaning of these words is that all atoms of the material Universe may with one accord approach for the constitution of the Atman's body. Thus, Atman is comprehended as the unique principle of the universal connection. With regard to manas, which had to perform this function in relation to the cognitive process, Atman transcends the boundaries of cognition and should be defined as the cosmological substance of universal connection, that is, the principal of integral organic totality. It widens the actual horizons of material relationships between man and nature, supporting the feeling of integrity and wholeness.

As a matter of fact, SyAdvAda-manjari raises some important questions which can be related to the philosophy of Indian atomism. Conceding together with the opponents of Vaisesika that Atman does not have the character of all-pervading substance, and trying to relate this assertion to the problem of body-constitution, we would have to agree that in actual fact Atman does not affect the whole quantity of atoms present in the Universe, but only a small portion of it - if not only one. Thus, the formation of body is left to the play of accident. We may admit, this time together with Ajita Kesakambalin and LokAyata, that atoms, quite independently of any external forces or substances, possess some kind of spontaneously manifested powers of attraction and repulsion which should be conceived of as the ultimate causa efficiens of the atomic conjunction and disjunction. Mallisena does not conceal the fact that any adherent of Jaina would willingly accept this kind of alternative, for, ultimately, it corresponds to the physicalistic bearing of Jaina philosophic doctrine.

Vaisesika, however, is searching for the exact criterion of combination which will be able to represent not only the proper ratio of the conjoining atoms, but also their comparative number. Willful attraction and repulsion, for all their conceptual advantages, do not allow for construing a consistently monistic theory because of the nonpredictability and asymmetrical nature of any one of the concrete atomic syntheses; no one can tell you when and what number of atoms in the Universe will spontaneously collide to form the body of [At]man. Yet, as a matter of fact, people have a size that is comparatively one and the same which can be placed somewhere in the golden mean of the cosmic scale. So the process of body-constitution is, as may be inferred, not of an arbitrary-accidental nature. According to Vaisesika, this event is directed by the category of Atman. In the initial period of the development of the Universe, or rather prior to the beginning, the metaphysical substance of Atman arranges the atoms in such a way that the future rise of a detinite set of human bodies is guaranteed in which the realization of the Law of Karman will eventually take place.

The heuristic advantages of this kind of reasoning are quite evident in the late cosmology of Vaisesika and particularly in that of Kesava Misra. Discussing the process of production and destruction of the world, the author of Tarka-bhAsA depicts one of the possible variants in the destroying of the empirical entities which is highly relevant to some problems raised within the contemporary poly-universalist cosmologiessometimes the destruction of the substances is through destruction of the inherent cause. When the said time of the earth, etc. elapses, there appears an intention of Mahesvara to destroy them. Then an activity is generated in the atoms. Thus, because of the disjunction [of the two atoms forming the molecule] the destruction of the conjunction [between them takes place]. The destruction of the earth, etc., proceeds by means of destruction of triad, etc., due to the destruction of the Substratum [occurring] 'in the destroyed own substrata - the molecules' (dvyanukesu svAsrayesu nastesu).[29]

This is a unique picture indeed, for the process of destruction proceeds in the same order as the foregoing process of creation, which involves the postulation of a large number of hidden variables regulating the final destruction of the atomic aggregates. Kesava Misra makes it clear that these variables are definitely put into action by the intentional will of God, that is, of paramAtman. There is, however, no God mentioned in the original doctrine of KanAda, and, for that reason, it should be supposed that the cosmological functions of the paramAtman should have been taken over by the purely metaphysical category of Atman. Following the same line of reasoning, a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that so far as there are many Atmans, a multitude of universes should also exist. Each Atman arranges the atoms of a corresponding universe in its own way, because of its all-pervasiveness and individuality. Thus the Universe we are living in is only a cross-section of an endless ensemble of worlds.

In the current cosmology, there are at least three possibilities for developing one or another kind of "poly-universalism," It is an accepted fact that the isotropy of the Universe depends on the escape velocity of the galaxies. So, according to Collins and Hawking, there is not only one universe, but a set of universes - an endless ensemble of worlds characterized by all possible initial conditions. Almost all of them are highly anisotropic. "On this view, the fact that we observe the universe to be isotropic would be simply a reflection of our own existence," and "there will be life only in those universes which tend toward isotropy at large times. The fact that we have observed the universe to be isotropic is therefore only a consequence of our own existence.[30]

Secondly, according to the so-called realistic interpretation of Quantum Mechanics,[31] there is no reduction of the wave function. This implies the substantiation of an ensemble of many really existing universes, which, however, are not in the empirical space-time, but in the continum of the quantum-mechanical superposition. The realist openly holds that the entirety of parallelly existing, superpositional quantum-mechanical states should never be reduced to one definite state delimited by the act of measurement, but is always a real variety. What is more, Everett, Graham, and Wheeler claim that the real variety of states corresponds to a real variety of universes. The view of the latter differs from Bruno's notion of many worlds in one substantial respect: the many universes of the quantum-mechanical cosmology are not subject to the action of one and the same set of physical laws. As a matter of fact, to be theoretically possible, they must rely upon different fundamental constants of different concrete value.

The third possibility arises from the recent inflation theories which involve the existence of many universes developing in different "bubbles" of material space-time. The last two alternatives come to be combined in the so-called final anthropic principle, proposed by Barrow and Tripler:

Life evolves in all of these universes in a quantum cosmology, and if life continues to exist in all of these universes, then all of these universes, which include all possible histories among them: will approach the Omega Point [a kind of final singularity which teleologically integrates the manifestations of life in all universes - borrowed from Teilhard de Chardin]. At the instant the Omega Point is reached, life will have gained control of all matter and forces not only in a single universe, but in all universes whose existence is logically possible.[32]

Let us now return to the anthropic argumentation of the Vaisesikas as represented by Mallisena. So, to begin with, they concede that the body may have some other origin differing from what is depicted in the orthodox sutras. Then the question should be asked as to how Atman comes into contact with its body, since the former is not the efficient cause of the latter. In solving this case, there are two logical alternatives: (1) the contact between them comes about at once, and (2) the contact occurs part by part.

The first alternative is but a particular corollary to the Vaisesika doctrine. The body obviously does consist of many parts and, respectively, of a great many atoms. Since the said conjunction takes place at one time, then the Atman should be all-pervading. The analysis of the second alternative is much more interesting: if Atman entered the body part by part, this would mean that Atman itself consists of many parts. This, however, is against the fundamental assumption stating the unity and indivisibility of Atman. Let us assume that Atman does actually consist of many parts and that to every atom of the body there is a corresponding particle of the Atman. Being composed of parts, Atman should be regarded as a kind of aggregate. The aggregates, however, cannot be causa sui, for they are caused at least by their component parts.

Now, there arise two additional alternatives: (1) the parts and the aggregate can be heterogeneous, and (2) they can be homogeneous. The first alternative is highly improbable, for the heterogeneous parts cannot be constructive elements of the whole, as, for example, threads do not constitute a pot. Such component elements can be the atoms of earth, and so forth, but, in this case. the aggregate composed of them is called body, and not Atman. Otherwise. we should be forced to admit the existence of atoms possessing consciousness; this, however, is not compatible with the sutras of KanAda.[33] On the other hand, Jaina authorities recognize, too, that there cannot be conscious atoms, in spite of the fact that Atman may occupy an atom of space.

The second alternative is also untenable, for the component parts should possess consciousness in order to produce it in the effect. This demonstration is but regressus ad infinitum and, what is more, turns the argumentation back to its very beginning. Supposing that the separate part has the characteristics of the effect-Atman (which is eternal and therefore cannot be an effect), we shall be obliged to see whether it is conjoined with the other parts of the body simultaneously and without any exception possible, or rather does it part by part. In this case, the result will be a neverending petitio principi. Otherwise, Atman would have to be constituted by some other selves. This is illogical, because of the impossibility of a plurality of Atmans being constitutive of a Self in a single body. Summarizing the views of the Vaisesikas, Mallisena-suri concludes that "only a pervasive Self is logical; because, if it has the size of the body, the stated faults exist.[34]

The Jaina position on this question is based upon the specific understanding of Atman, namely, jivAtman, as a kind of pulsating atom which may be found both in an ordinary atom and in an innumerable number of space atoms (pradesa).[35] As for the controversy-between Jaina and Vaisesika on the size of Atman, it should be noted that the most important issue arising from its critical analysis concerns the possibility of going deeper in the articulation of the cognitive functions of Atman with reference to the atomistic structure of the world. This may impart a new, anthropic sense to the metaphysical and cosmological tradition present in the philosophy of Indian atomism.

NOTES

1. According to KanAda, "breathing, swallowing, opening and closing [of the eyes], life, motions of the manas, gffections of the other sense organs, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition and [other] are the marks of Atman" (Vaisesika-sutra IV.2.4, in The Vaisesika Darsana, with UpaskAra of Sankara Misra and Vivrtti of JayanArAyana, ed. JayanArAyana TarkapanchAna, Bibliotheca Indica, New Series, Nos. 4-6, 8, 10 (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1861); hereafter cited as Vaisesika-sutra, VS, and UpaskAra). The Sanskrit particle "ca" (the latter "and") here implies some other qualities which are enumerated, for instance, in the Tarkakaumudi of LaugAksi BhAskara:

Atman is what possesses the general class of Atmanity. It is two-fold because of the division into soul (jiva) and Isvara. Soul is the subject of non-eternal knowledge etc., and the substratum of fourteen qualities - number, measure [or size], separateness, conjunction, disjunction, intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, dharma, adharma, disposition. It is diversified according to the body, due to the variety of pleasure, pain, etc. Iisvara is the subject of the eternal knowledge. etc., and the bearer of eight qualities-number, measure, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, intellect, desire, volition. He is only one and devoid of body, due to the lack of the unseen (adrsta) cause of the body [i.e., due to the absence of adrsta comprehended as the instrumental cause in the process of body-constitution]. Or, it might be objected, he has body due to the rise, that is, the generation of that body by means of our adrsta. Through our adrsta there can be no rise of body, even of a liberated (from the cycle of transmigration) [one] - such is the established tenet. [Further,] because of the absence of desire, etc., as the cause for [the rise of! the body... [the characteristic of] atman is also two-fold-all-pervading and eternal. (LaugAksi BhAskara, Tarka-kaumudi, ed. M. N. Dvivedi, Bombay Sansitrit Series, N 32 (Bombay: The Department of Public Instruction, 1886), pp. 3-4)

This comparatively long quotation may serve as a good introduction to the problems we are going to discuss. The most crucial of them is who is responsible for the constitution of arman's body? Apparently it is not Iisvara, because it is said that he does not need any body at all. If we deny to the intimate Atman the capability of creating its own body, then the distinction between the immanent and paramount atman would be thoroughly useless, because it is the immanent ritman whose differentia specifica is to possess body, and not the paramdtman. On the other hand, LaugAksi BhAskara seems to have represented the views of some old adherents of the anthropic explanation of the Universe, claiming that even the body of God, if we concede that there is such a thing like divine body, should be produced by means of human adrsra. Or, if we assume thepanentheistic point of view, man and God, being in mutual dependence, take care of each other-the task of man being to restore the body of God, that is, cosmos, by means of the results of his good or bad actions, i.e., karman. One cannot help noting that this is indeed a participatory universe we are living in.

2. Critically analyzing Vyomasiva's Vyomavati, Chandramati's Dasa-padArtha-samgraha, and many other canonical works in the tradition of NyAya-Vaisesika, Erich Frauwallner, in his paper "Der ursprungliche Anfang der Vaisesika-Sutren," has convincingly demonstrated that the original, but unfortunately lost, three aphorisms of the Vaisesika-sutra "kennen den Gottesbegriff noch nicht." Yet, the VS I.1.1-4, in their present form, represent the Vaisesika System as a kind of orthodox soteriology. "Es ist aber klar, dass dies dem Geist des Systems widerspricht. Denn das Vaisesikam ist eine reine Naturphilosophie, welche die Erscheinungswelt zu verstehen und zu erklaren sucht, und hat mit einer Erloesungslehre nichts zu tun... Das legt aber die Vermutung nahe, dass die angefuhrte Beginn der Vaisesik-Sutren eine spatere Zutat ist, die unter dem Einfluss der religibsen Strimungen einen anderen alteren Anfang verdrangt hat" (Erich Frauwallner, Nachgelassene Werke. Bd.l: Aufsaetze, Beitraege, Skizzen, Herausgegeben von Ernst Steinkellner, Oterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, Ed. 438 (Wien: Verlag der Oster. Ak. d. Wiss., 1984), S. 36-40). However, it cannot be denied that the category of atman has been present even in the most ancient layers of the Vaisesika, forming thus the peculiar counterpart of the structural category of atom. And, therefore, when we try to explain the activation of atoms, there being no God, we should rely exclusively on the cosmo-initiating functions of dtman. Then the latter must be defined as an example of transcendental naturalistic category.

3. Brandon Carter has put into use two formulations of the anthropic principle (Brandon Carter, "Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology," in Confrontation of Cosmological Theories with Observational Data (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974), pp. 291-294). According to the weak anthropic principle, what one may expect from the observation should be restricted by the conditions necessary for the existence of ourselves as observers. According to the strong anthropic principle, the Universe, and hence the fundamental constants, should be of such a nature as to favor the constitution of observers at a given stage in its development. Or, to be Cartesian for a while: I think, therefore the world is what it is! The unavoidable fact we do exist and are in a position to ask cosmological questions is, according to J. A. Wheeler, a sufficient demonstration of the necessity to consider quite seriously the idea of the biological selection of the fundamental constants. On the other hand, "to select is impossible unless there are options to select between. Exactly such options would seem for the first time to be held out by the only overall picture of the gravitational collapse of the Universe that one sees how to put forward today, the pregeometry black box model of the reprocessing of the Universe" (Martin Rees, Remo Ruffini, and john A. Wheeler, Black Holes, Gravitational Waves and Cosmology; An lntroduction to Current Research, Thus, the anthrophysics and Space Physics Serues (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1974, p.307). Thus, the anthropic principle, with its basic cosmo-mythological assumption concerning the biological selection of the fundamental constants, comes close to the elaboration of a nontraditional poly-universalist cosmology. More about this see in my forthcoming Introduction to the Philosophy of Indian Atomism, Part IV, chapter 4: "Cosmic Cycles, Design Argument and Many-Worlds Idea."

4. A very representative examination of the relationships between the atomic substances and the principle of life (jivAtman) is given in the paper by Anuradha Khanna and Navjyoti Singh, "Physical and Biological Notions in Jaina Cosmology," Aligarh Journal of Oriental Studies 3, no. 2 (Autumn 1986): III-124.

5. According to the founder of comparative philosophy, the idea of a formless principle without dimension and magnitude, being itself the condition of form, extension, and magnitude, is only an equivalent to the idea of Atman, or Brahman, which is also imperceptible, for it lies in the foundation of all perceptible things. We, concludes Masson-Oursel, do once again see the equalization of the two main types of the Absolute-that of the infinitesimality and the other of the infinitely great. "La pensee indienne a sans cesse-comme la reflexion de notre Pascal-cherche son equilibre entre ces deux abimes, qu'elle ait suivi la 'voie moyenne' des Bouddhistes entre 1'etre et le non-etre, ou qu'eile ait hesite `a la fa.con brahmanique entre I'atomisme et le monisme" (Paul Masson-Oursel, "L'atomisme indien," Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'`Etranger 99, no. 1 (1925): 368).

6. Brahma-sutra SArikarbAsya 11.2.15: "Similarly, atoms may not be destroyed or disintegrated but may be transformed into a prior non-atomic condition, which is the condition of the being of Brahman" (VedAnta Explained: Samkara's Commentary on the Brahma-sutras, trans. V. H. Date, 2d ed.,2 vols. (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1973), 1:308).

7. Of course, Atmalogy can be compared to a kind of transcendental spelaeology (the expression is J. M. Findlay's); yet, for the sake of our analysis, it would be much more correct to denote it as transcendental paleocosmology, in the sense that it explores the past of the Universe from the point of view of metaphysical subjectivity. Only in this sense can I accept the definition of Atman as the transcendental horizon of jiva, as proposed by R. Sinari (Ramakant Sinari, "The Quest for an Ontology of Human Self," in Indian Philosophy: Past and Future, ed. S. S. Rama Rao Pappu and R. Puligandha (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), pp. 126-127).

8. Vaisesika-sutra IV.2.20.

9. Vaisesika-sutra IV.2.5.

10. "yathA vAyuparamAnoravayavakalpanAyAm na pramAnamato nityatvam tathA ca mano'pi yathA gunavattvAdvAyuparamAnu-dravyam tathAtmA 'pityArthah" (UpaskAra IV.2.5).

11. VallabhAchArya, NyAya-lilAvati, ed. H. Sastri and D. Sastri, ChowkhambA Sanskrit Series (Benares: Jai Krishnadas Haridas Gupta, 1934), pp. 314-315.

12. According to the doctrine, there is a variety of Atmans. Why 'circumstantial' (vyavasthAta)? The circumstance is objective regulation (pratiniyama - a strict rule for any particular case), as for instance, someone is rich, and someone Is close-fisted (anka); one is happy, and (the] other is misfortunate; one is of noble origin, while [the] other is of mean genus; one is savant and [the] other is scoundrel (jAlpa). These circumstances [which in such cases are] impossible without the generating division of Atmans, substantiate the variety of Atmans. It cannot be held that as the circumstances of one and the same Atman [are defined] by the difference in birth, and by difference between childhood, youth and old age, so the difference between the bodies of Caitra, Maitra, etc., should be [a diversifying factor which implies the presence of one soul only], because the contradictory properties [in an Atman] appear due to the differences in time. (UpaskAra IV.2.20)

The attitude of Udayana in solving the problem of plurality of Atmans sounds considerably more metaphysical:

From the proposition of the circumstances the number [is derived] as variety of Atmans which is said [to be inferred] from the circumstances - this is shown in the sutra. It is positively established that earth and the others up to AkAsa possess [the characteristic of] plurality (bahutva), while AkAsa [together with space and time is charactenzed] by oneness, and the intervening [at the very end substantial categories] are visualized [darsita is declined in Nominative Dual referring thus to Atman and manas] here in their variety and treated by means of plurality (The Aphorisms of the Vaisesika Philosophy, by KanAda: with the Commentary PadArtha-dharma-samgraha of PrasartapAda and the Gloss KiranAvali of UdayanAcArya, ed. V. P. Dvivedi and D. Sastri, Benares Sanskrit Series, N 15, 50, 155'-157 (Benares: Braj Bhushan Das & Co., 1919), pp. 149-150).

As for the regulation through circumstances, continues UdayanAcArya, it should be noted in the first place that due to them one is supposed to be circling (samsArArati in the round of transmigrations, while the other is getting liberated.

13. It is, however, not materialist in the sense that we infer the existence of the other Selves from the results of the common process of material production which, to use the words of Marx, makes us to regard the other things and Selves in the world sensually, that is, in the form of subjectively comprehended practice. The explanation of Sankara Misra is to a greater extent phenomenologically materialist, because he, just like Max Scheler and Edmund Husserl did at the very beginning of our century, tries to produce material evidence psychologically substantiating the existence of the other Selves. The point of view is again activist, but this is a biological activity rather than a social one:

After having demonstrated the derivation of one's own Self, now the derivation of the other Self (parAtma) is stated. "In the internal Self" (pratyagAtman) means "in our own Self" (svAtmani). Activity and inactivity are special modi of volition (prayatna) generated by the desire and aversion. They are fruit-bearing (phalaka) as to the acquisition of the boon and avoiding the nonboon (ahita), and, apart from this, are characterized as generated by "corporeal action of definite direction" (cestupA). Therefore, when we see directed action in [some] other body, we infer the other Self. Tde directed action is generated by volition 'due to the general notion of directed action' (cestAtvAt) [which] is similar to my directed action. And this volition is generated by Atman because of the general notion of volition, similar to my volition, etc. (UpaskAra IV.1.19)

14. The PadArtha-dharma-samgraha of PrasastapAda with the NyAya-kandali of SridAdra, trans. Ganganatha Jha (Allahabad: E. J. Lazarus & Co., 1916),44.

15. When trying metaphysically to reconstruct reality, NyAya-Vaisesika obviously prefers the dynamic point of view. That is why there is no separate category of motion here, as in the categorial schema of Aristotle; every motion in the world is a converted form of action (karman).

16. It is not by chance that the last quality of Atman is called samskAra, which may be translated roughly as "intention" or "dispositional tendency."

17. John Archibald Wheeler, "Beyond the Black Hole," in Some Strangeness in the Propertion: A Centennial to Celebrate the Achievements of AIbert Einstein, ed. Harry Woolf (London and Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1980), p. 362.

18. The NyAya-vArttika of Uddyotakara, ed. V. P. Dvivedi and D. Sastri, Kashi Sanskrit Series, N 33 (Benares: Haridas Gupta, 1916), p. 457; hereafter cited as NyAya-vArttika, When divorced from the context, the compound word denoting "pradhAna, atom and karman" can be translated as the "actions of the fundamental atoms"; then the whole proposition assumes a thoroughly physicalistic sense.

19. "TatkAritatvAdahetuh." The NyAyasutras with VAtsyAyana's BhAshya and extracts from the NyAyavArttika and the TAtparyatikA, ed. G. S. Tailanga, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, N 11 (Benares: Lazarus, 1896), p. 199; hereafter cited as NyAya-sutra and, correspondingly, NyAyabhAsya.

20. Ibid., pp. 199-200.

21. The NyAya-vArttika-tAtparya-tika of VAcaspati Misra, ed. G. S. Tailanga; Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, N 15 (Benares: Lazarus, 1898), p. 418; hereafter cited as NyAya-vArttika-tAtparyatika.

22. G. Sundara Ramaiah, Nature and Destiny of Soul in Indian Philosophy (Visakhapatman: Andhra University Press, 1980), p. 252.

23. NVTT 1V.1.21, as cited by Tailanga in the NyAya-bhAsya, p. 200. Yet, in the Tailanga edition of the NVTT, the corresponding text of VAcaspati Misra is a little bit different: "Although the internal Atmans are the bearers of the connection with the non-eternal knowledge, Atman in general is just like what is connected with the eternal knowledge, on account of the fact that it is the bearer of the connection with the quality of buddhi, etc. It is wrongly [to suppose that Atman is the bearer of eternal knowledge only] because of the connection with the eternal color, etc..." (NyAya-vArttika-tAtparya-tikA, p. 419).

24. The expression is "murtimaddravyasarizbandhitvAdziti"; see: NyAya-bhAsya, pp. 200-201.

25. NyAya- vArtrika-tAtparya-tikA, p. 421.

26. No khalu paramAnubhedAn PratiksennajnasamavAyinasca karmAsayAnanyah sakto jnatumrte tAdrsAdisavarAditi prapancitamadhastAt. ParapurusasamavetAvapi IarmAdharmAvid-
histhAtum saktoti sambandhAd na hi sAiksAtsamyogasamavAyAveva sambandhau samyuktasamyogisamavAyasyApi tadbhAvAt. Samyukrrih khalvisvarena paramAnvAdayah taisca ksennajnAh tatsamavetau dharmAdharmAviti sam~yuktasamavAyo ksennajnenesvarasy samyogAt ajasamyogasykApyupapAditavAt. DharmAdharmau paramAnAnvA svadharmopagmhamanrarenApi cesvarah svakArAbhimukhAn karisyati visavidyAvidiva visasakalam kriyArambhAbhimukham. Etena cetanopAdAnatvamapi vyAkhyAtam. (NyAya-vArttika-tAtparya-tikA, p. 425) Here we have consciously omitted the introductory clause translated in the text above.

27. NyAya-vArttika, p. 459. In another MS. fixed in the edition of Dvivedi and Sastri under No. IV, the expression "directed by consciousness" is replace by the logically more consistent "directed by an intelligent cause" (buddhimatkAranAdhisthita). This improvement is of exceedingly great importance, for it safeguards the text against any possible misinterpretation in the spirit of the mentalist constructivism as developed by the philosophy of YogAcAra. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that consciousness, denoted in Indian philosophy by the term cetanA, is not devoid of some volitive sense components. Consciousness is what is produced by means of volitional effort. In this respect, self-consciousness is not the pure autoreflection of the transcendental subject, as supposed by contemporary phenomenology as well as by German classical philosophy, but rather a form of an allround self-control.

28. SyAdvAda-manjari, The Flower Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine of Sri MalliSena-sriri, trans. & annot. F. W. Thomas (Berlin: Akademie-verlag, 1960), p. 54; hereafter cited as SyAdvada-manjari

29. The Tarka-bhAsA of Kesava Misra, with the Commentary of Govardhana, ed. Sh. M. Paranjape (Poona: Shiralkar & Co., 1894), p. 72.

30. Charles B. Collins and Steven W. Hawking, "Why Is the Universe Isotropic?" The Astrophysical Journal 180 (1973): 317.

31. A good representation of it is given in Bryce S. DeWitt's "Quantum Mechanics and Reality: Could the Solution to the Dilemma of Indeterminism be a Universe in Which All Possible Outcomes of an Experiment Actually Occur?" Physics Today (September 1970): 30-35.

32. John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 677.

33. Vaisesika-sutra III.1.3-6.

34. SyAdvAda-manjari, p. 54.

35. More about this see in my "Atomic Synthesis and Evolution: An inquiry into the Jaina Views on Matter, Space and Time," Struktur und Dynamik wissenschaftlicher Theorien (Frankfurt am Mein, Bern, and New York: Verlag Peter Lang, 1986), pp. 99-119.